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Europe in the Balkan Mirror
Abstract: The article discusses the three dominant, Europe-wide, constructions of 
Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and claims that all three found 
their proponents in the Balkans in the same period, while no specifically Balkan 
construction of Europe can be identified. The discourses which constructed Europe 
were transnational, and every search for national discourses must recognize that they 
are always fractured and contradictory, composed of various elements originating in 
Europe-wide discourses on Europe. Throughout this period the dominant discourse 
of Europe was shaped by the discourse of modernity and modernization, not only in 
Europe but in other parts of the globe as well. Several commentators have already 
noted that the current challenge of the interwar construction of Europe – peace, 
prosperity, democracy and human rights – mirrors the crisis of Yugoslavia, and many 
examples point to the unsustainability of this construction at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers a valuable lesson in humility and 
defines the oft-repeated phrase of “belonging together” as listening to the other in the 
belief that the other may be right, which should be taken as a starting point for any 
future construction of Europe.
Keywords: construction of Europe, modernity, modernization, anti-modernism, Euro-
pean Union, the Balkans, imperialism, post-democracy
What is “Europe’s” mode of existence? As a geographical category, “Europe” is unstable: putting aside anecdotal but still indicative ex-
pressions – such as Napoleon’s claim that Africa begins at the Pyrenees, or 
Metternich’s that Asia begins in Vienna’s Landstrasse – the borders of the 
continent have always been contested: to the east, the continent cannot be 
limited by any clear demarcation line, and looks more like a Eurasian penin-
sula than as a self-contained geographical entity; to the west, it may or may 
not include the British Isles. As a historical category, “Europe” is even more 
undetermined, and has always been defined relationally: in early modern 
times, it defined itself as Christendom, as opposed to the Islamic Ottoman 
threat; in the wake of the waning of Ottoman power, and coinciding with 
the progressive secularization of European societies and with their grabbing 
of other parts of the globe – which would reach 84 percent of the world at 
the peak of the colonial period – “Europe” self-styled itself as “civilization” 
opposed to barbarism and savagery, thus legitimizing its conquests; simulta-
neously, it became the “West”, as opposed to the colonized Asian “East”; the 
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catastrophe of the First World War briefly put “Europe” back on the agen-
da, but the ideological, political and military circumstances after the Second 
World War strengthened the West/East division, the “East” referring this 
time not to Asia, but to the eastern half of the continent. As a “spiritual 
essence”, as a number of interwar enthusiasts called the elusive something 
which allegedly defined Europeanness, or as a set of “European values”, as 
their contemporary counterparts prefer to call it, “Europe” is anything but 
unambiguous: it invented both human rights and Auschwitz; it promoted 
tolerance as well as racism and anti-Semitism; it patented democracy and 
absolutism, Fascism and other forms of totalitarianism; it simultaneously 
championed liberty and the slave trade; its thought was rationalist as well as 
irrationalist, religious and mystical. “Europe” exists only as a discursive con-
struction; not as a fact, but as an interpretation.1 And as such, it is not one 
but many – everywhere and at all times. All these various forms of “Europe” 
shape political, economic and social programmes, or what we grow accus-
tomed to calling identities: who we think we are, what a life worth living is, 
and where we think we are going. 
It becomes even more difficult to reduce these multiple forms of Eu-
rope to a single one when we remember that all European nations con-
sidered, and continue to consider themselves as part of Europe, and at the 
same time as something separate, different, capable of defining a relation to 
it.2 The only two exceptions seem to be France, which inherited the early 
nineteenth-century tradition of equating the outcome of the French revo-
lution with Europe, and for a brief period also Austria, which at that same 
time represented the opposite of French Europe, namely the Catholic, con-
servative Europe of the throne and the altar.3 For all other European na-
tions, Europe has meant “all continental nations minus us”. We recognize 
ourselves as slightly different from the picture we constructed as Europe 
– which is only natural, as this construction is always an ideal, never some-
thing to be empirically confirmed – and this difference is experienced as a 
wound which hurts. At the same time, this wound we recognize as our own 
1 Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality (London: Palgrave, 1995), 3; 
Bo Stråth, “Europe as a discourse”, in Bo Stråth, ed., Europe and the Other and Europe as 
the Other (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000), 13–44.
2 Luise Passerini, “From the ironies of identity to the identities of irony”, in Anthony 
Pagden, ed., The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to European Union (Cambridge Mass.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Cambridge University Press, 2002), 205.
3 Gilbert Weiss, “A.E.I.O.U. – Austria Europeae Imago, Onus, Unio?” and Robert 
Frank, “The Meaning of Europe in French national discourse”, in Mikael af Malmborg 
and Bo Stråth, eds., The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention within and among 
Nations (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), 263–283 and 311–326.
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identity; we are, both individually and collectively, the map of our scars and 
wounds. Every psychotherapist can tell about the fear each patient has to 
overcome at the beginning of therapy: they know that something in them 
needs to change, but at the same time they fear change because they fear 
not being themselves any longer afterwards; they want to change and to 
remain who they are. Hence, therapists must convince them that they are 
going to change, and feel and live better, but that they are also going to 
remain the same. It is, of course, a paradox: one wants to preserve what one 
also wants to change. Nations do not seem to be much different: they also 
want to change, to partake in this idealization they have constructed and 
called Europe, but they also want to stay who they are. This is the mean-
ing of the claim, often repeated in all national debates on Europe, that “we 
don’t want to be drawn into Europe, because we will cease to exist when we 
become like everybody else”. There is something touching, both amusing 
and sad, in this belief that one can ever become like “everybody else”, as if 
there were only one type of being outside us, as if all European societies and 
cultures were happily homogeneous, and only we were uncomfortably but 
proudly different. Hence the “bridge” metaphor, easily spotted in all nation-
al discourses of Europe: there are very few European nations which do not 
imagine themselves as a bridge between East and West, Europe and Asia, 
Europe and Africa, or Europe and America.4 As they are all the same – the 
Swedes and the Portuguese, the Irish and the Romanians, the Greeks and 
the Germans – and only we are different and insufficiently like “them”, we 
can put our insufficiently European part to good use by connecting Europe 
with something else. The bridge metaphor means: we will change, and we 
will remain who we are. Our being insufficiently like the rest of them will 
be only a consequence of our mission: our impurity, our difference from this 
idealized model, which is at the same time our deepest identity, can be pre-
served, because as a bridge we are allowed to stand on two different shores 
at the same time. The only European nation which never thought of itself 
4 For individual European nations’ appropriation of the “bridge” metaphor see chapters 
by Törnquist-Plewa, Hroch, Jáuregui, Spohn, and Ludlow in Malmborg and Stråth, 
eds., The Meaning of Europe; Christopher Browning and Marko Lehti, “Beyond East-
West: marginality and national dignity in Finnish Identity construction”, Nationalities 
Papers 35/4 (2007), 691–716; Tamás Hofer, “East and West in self-image of Hungar-
ians”, in Teppo Korhonen, ed., Encountering Ethnicities. Ethnological Aspects of Ethnicity, 
Identity and Migration (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1995), 215–238; 
Roumen Daskalov, Images of Europe: A Glance from the Periphery (Florence: European 
University Institute, Working Papers SPS No. 94/8, 1994); Antonis Liakos, “The canon 
of European identity: transmission and decomposition”, in Luisa Passerini, ed., The 
Question of European Identity: A Cultural Historical Approach (Florence: European Uni-
versity Institute, Working Papers HEC No. 98/1, 1998), 53–59. 
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as a bridge is – again – France, convinced as it is, that, as Stanislav Vinaver 
once said, everything of any value in this world can be traced back to some 
distant French origin.5
Nations construct “Europe” in different ways at different times, and 
these constructions are never smooth, coherent and consistent. On the con-
trary, each national construction of Europe resembles a battlefield, a stormy 
dialogue, a song sung by a choir which has not had enough time to practise: 
it is always a field in which ideas are put forward and fought over. Small 
wonder, if we keep in mind that the national debates about Europe most 
often have as their aim defining or constructing the national identity of the 
nation in question, its future direction as well as the version of its past which 
the nation cares to remember.6 These constructions resemble depositories 
of images, concepts and ideas, in which images able to arouse emotions 
predominate over clearly defined concepts and coherent ideas. Those who 
have constructed “Europe”, intentionally or unintentionally, have operated 
according to the model exploited by advertising agencies: connect images 
with emotional content, and only then engage rationality. The economic 
history of the continent, for this very reason, never arouses much passion; 
but histories which promote connections with emotionally charged images 
always do. Popular political discourses, as opposed to academic ones, oper-
ate in the same manner: it is a pity that those whose jobs involve defining 
measurements of time have not yet come upon the idea that a second can be 
defined as the period of time between the moment in which a crisis appear 
anywhere in the world and the moment someone cries “he is a new Hitler”. 
The politician in question, singled out for regime change, is thus associ-
ated with an emotionally charged image, and then the usual mechanism of 
regime change starts to roll. Rational assessment follows only twenty years 
later, when this crisis becomes an academic question. But it always follows, 
if this is any consolation.
There is always more than one “Europe” in any given national dis-
course, which are often incompatible and on a collision course. Thus, there 
are several Romanian “Europes”, sometimes so different that they have 
nothing in common; but all of these have much in common with various 
Polish or Spanish “Europes”. If we take a step back from national con-
structions of “Europe”, we see several larger discourses which operate across 
the continent, and find their proponents in every continental society. There 
is the Europe of antimodernists: a Europe of science and technology, the 
French revolution and secularism, and it allegedly destroys the soul of the 
5 Stanislav Vinaver, Evropa u vrenju. Putopisi i memoarski spisi (Novi Sad: Dnevnik, 
1991), 214.
6 Frank, “The Meaning of Europe”, 311. 
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nation, or soul as such, and the balance between nature and humans, or the 
God-given balance between classes, churches and states. There is a discourse 
of Europe of progress, education, civil liberties and democracy, rooted in the 
Enlightenment and its offspring, modern science; there is also a Fascist Eu-
rope, an integral part of Fascist ideology, which combines elements of the 
former two. Comparatively new and much less influential is the discourse 
of Europe of social rights, which still needs to find more vocal proponents. 
Each of them constructs an allegedly authentic European past and claims 
that it only furthers what Europe has always been about, and this is the rea-
son why we have never agreed, and never will, which cultural traditions we 
want to include in our heritage, and which particular one defines Europe.
All these discourses have circulated in the Balkans since the late eigh-
teenth century: Europe, with its avatars such as the “West” and “civilization”, 
was primarily constructed as progress, development, education, efficient ad-
ministration, science, rationalism, and secularism. This list is evidence that 
Europe was a signifier for what in the twentieth century is known as mo-
dernity. This discourse was in the Balkans emotionally charged with mourn-
ing, shame and regret: the Balkan societies of the nineteenth century clearly 
perceived their belated entry into modernity, and complaints about being 
late are the most prominent element of this version of a broader continen-
tal discourse on Europe. In this respect, the Balkans is no exception: the 
same emotional tone, expressed in exactly the same words, can be found in 
Spanish, Italian and Polish constructions of Europe.7 It defined Europe in 
opposition to the East, Asia and Africa, and Asian societies readily adopted 
it as their own. In the Ottoman Empire, Japan and India it had the same 
effects as in the Balkans. It was created as a result of the interaction between 
the colonizing societies from the north-western part of the continent, with 
pretty much all other parts of the globe save North America, and dissemi-
nated not only by Western travellers, diplomats, journalists and scholars, but 
by their counterparts in other parts of the globe as well. When it began to 
dominate – and it was the original and still is the most influential discourse 
on Europe – and the Balkan elites started to enquire about the reasons 
for their belatedness, they came up with two sets of answers. They blamed 
their own mentality – in exactly the same manner as Spaniards, Italians and 
Poles – and their geographical position, which enabled contamination with 
what was non-European. Thus Spain and Italy were too “African” and had 
to “de-Africanize” themselves; Poland looked into the abyss of economic 
backwardness and stagnation, poverty, disorder and lawlessness, which for 
Poles was Russia; and the Balkan societies never tired of blaming the Ot-
7 See chapters by Törnquist-Plewa, Jáuregui, and af Malmborg in Malmborg and Stråth, 
eds., The Meaning of Europe.
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toman Empire, their own East, for historical belatedness. In all these cases, 
one feature is strikingly similar: in all these societies the nation state was 
rightly perceived as the agent of modernization or Europeanization – and 
it was missing everywhere but in Spain, though throughout the nineteenth 
century it experienced such catastrophic erosion and decay that it could no 
longer be existent. Paradoxically, when in the early twentieth century Ot-
toman intellectuals opened the same debate, they too blamed the Ottoman 
Empire for the non-Europeanness of the Turks, and demanded a Turkish 
nation state.
What Italy, Poland and the Balkan societies had in common, was that 
these nations had no empires, and Spain and Turkey joined this club of the 
likeminded only when their own empires came to an end. This is what the 
largest European zone – Central Europe – has in common with the Euro-
pean peninsulas and Poland. The absence of the German nation state in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, the absence of an overseas empire and a 
comparatively late start in industrial revolution, all coalesced into a perfect 
background on which to develop a lack of confidence – in sharp contrast 
with the overconfident industrializing and imperialistic north-west – and 
contributed to the presence of this same discourse of the “West”, which 
was in Germany the preferred name for what in the Balkans was called 
“Europe”. This is why Germany and Austria were, during the Romantic 
period, the cradle of the second most important discourse of Europe: the 
Europe of Christianity, of the “soul”, especially the soul of the nation, of 
deep Kultur opposed to superficial and materialistic civilisation. There is 
nothing exclusively German about it: it is a Europe-wide discourse, and op-
posed to the Europe of progress and science, as anti-modernism is opposed 
to modernism. By way of illustration, if for Germans in the early nineteenth 
century France had stood for soulless civilisation, dehumanization, mate-
rialism and science, a century later the tables had turned: for Henry Berg-
son in 1915 anti-European Germany stood for mechanization, science and 
technology, and European France for culture, spirit and nature.8 In 1915, 
of course, France had good reason to feel less confident, and Bergson only 
repeated what German Romantics had discovered a hundred years earlier: 
that culture, spirit and nature can be claimed, as a sort of moral victory, by 
those who are plagued by feelings of insecurity and inferiority.
The equal weight and influence of these two master discourses can 
be seen even today in the absence of any mention of the dominant, foun-
dational European cultural tradition in the draft of European constitution. 
Its authors long argued over which intellectual tradition is more central to 
8 Henri Bergson, The Meaning of the War. Life & Matter in Conflict (London: T.F. Unwin, 
1915).
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Europe, the Enlightenment or Christianity, and since they could not reach 
an agreement, they eventually dropped the issue altogether.9
However, these two discourses could be claimed by very different 
speakers, who tried to isolate their elements – various representations and 
images – and combine them into new ones. And they need not be only 
Europeans: the discourse of Europe is as much an Asian as a European 
construction.10 Rabindranath Tagore in his book Nationalism (1917) elo-
quently praised Asian spirituality and preservation of the idea of fully hu-
man life, as opposed to the materialism, mechanical organization and greed 
characteristic of Europe, which brought him enormous reputation as an 
Eastern sage, as it neatly dovetailed with anti-rationalistic currents which 
dominated our supposedly hyper-rational continent at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.11 It seems at first sight that Tagore was yet another Asian 
anti-modernist, who took at face value the flattering construction of India – 
put forward by similar European anti-modernists – as the cradle of all reli-
gions and spirituality.12 But Tagore at the same time praised modernization 
as well, claiming that it was necessary and beneficial. It is very significant 
that Tagore did so in an address to a Japanese audience, in a country which 
was modernizing itself at great speed, but without becoming a European 
outpost in the Pacific. What seems obvious to us today – to be more pre-
cise, what is obvious to academics, but what has yet to become obvious in 
popular and political discourses of Europe – namely, that modernity is not 
one but multiple, that there are alternative paths to modernity, and that 
its origin in Europe need not be taken to mean that Europeans have a 
monopoly on it, Tagore diagnosed by uncoupling Europe and modernity.13 
9 Tomas Majer, Identitet Evrope. Jedinstvena duša Evropske Unije? (Belgrade: Albatros 
Plus and Službeni glasnik, 2009), 16–17.
10 Bonnet even claims that the “West” has been entirely the invention of those who 
considered themselves “non-West”. See Alastair Bonnett, The Idea of the West. Culture, 
Politics and History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 64.
11 Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism (London: Papermac, 1991).
12 Throughout the nineteenth century, this image of India was gradually constructed 
by various European scholars, editors and translators of the Sanskrit canon. It reached 
its peak in Friedrich Max Müller’s “science of religion”, but its main popularisers and 
disseminators in the West were Indian scholars, such as Vivekananda. The idea of the 
“East” may have been invented by those who were “non-East”, but it eventually proved 
to be a joint enterprise, just like the idea of the “West”. 
13 European and American social science accepted the idea of multiple or alternative 
modernities only quite recently. On alternative and multiple modernities see, for ex-
ample, Dili Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., Alternative Modernities (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2001); S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities”, Daedalus 129/1 
(2000), 1–29; Peter Van Der Veer, “The Global History of ‘Modernity’”, Journal of the 
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Modernization and Europeanization was not one and the same thing for 
him, and his Japanese audience certainly had good reasons to agree. And 
he was not the only one to put it into words in such an explicit manner: 
at about the same time, the Turkish writer and sociologist Ziya Gökalp 
(1876–1924) made the same point in his programmatic article “Towards 
Western Civilization”. He accurately diagnosed the historical reasons for 
Turkish “backwardness”, blaming it on the rule of the Ottoman Empire 
over Turks, and claimed: “There is only one road to salvation: to advance in 
order to reach […] Europeans in the science and industry as well as in mili-
tary and judicial institutions. And there is only one means to achieve this: to 
adapt ourselves to Western civilization completely”.14 But Ziya Gökalp also 
pondered: “How can the Islamic world ultimately survive under such con-
ditions? How can we maintain our religious and national independence?”15 
In other words, how can the Turks modernize and remain “of the Turk-
ish nation and Islamic religion”? It is not the point here to conclude that 
Gökalp worried needlessly, as we can see today that Turks can modernize 
and become even more Islamic in the process, but it is worth recalling that 
Europe, even if constructed only as modernization, always and everywhere 
prompts its adherents as well as its opponents to point out that they them-
selves happen to be something separate and different, that they are not “like 
everybody else”. At exactly the same time, Jovan Skerlić (1977–1914), a 
Serbian politician and literary historian, wrote: “For new nations there are 
but two roads – either to accept Western culture and live, as the Japanese 
have done, or to oppose it and be overrun, as has happened to the American 
Indians and Australian Aborigines.”16 Skerlić was the most fanatical Euro-
pean in the Balkans of his time – the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, when there was no shortage of fanatical Europeans in the Balkans 
– whose whole work can be summed up in the sentence “either the West or 
death”. But he also wrote that Europe was a “cluster of mutually envious, 
predatory and soulless bullies”, imperialist, selfish and hypocritical in its 
policy, and unable or unwilling to uphold its own values.17 Yet, “one should 
be a good European,” Skerlić kept repeating. Tagore, Gökalp and Skerlić 
reveal what the message Europe sent to them was: faced with the threat of 
being crushed and annihilated by more powerful and already modernized 
Economic and Social History of the Orient 41/3 (1998), 285–294; Timothy Mitchell, ed., 
Questions of Modernity (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
14 Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization (Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood Press, 1957), 276. 
15 Ibid.
16 Jovan Skerlić, Feljtoni, skice i govori (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1964), 95.
17 Ibid. 285.
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societies, crush and annihilate yourself in order to survive, reinvent yourself 
in their image in order to be preserved, disappear such as you are in order 
to live. Skerlić was willing to sacrifice in the process whatever particularities 
his nation may have had; Gökalp worried about preserving his Turkishness 
and Islam; but Tagore – and these different scales of acceptance, worry and 
rejection most probably resulted from the different global standing, richness 
of tradition and confidence of their respective societies – rejected Europe as 
an imperialistic menace, from which other societies could be protected only 
if they managed, like the Japanese, to modernize while simultaneously pre-
serving their cultural difference. Indeed, his book Nationalism should have 
been more accurately entitled Imperialism, as this is what he wrote about, 
which brings us to the third important discourse of Europe: the mighty 
continent which rules the world. While the previous two discourses are still 
very much with us, this one is quickly becoming historically redundant. Eu-
rope as the world empire – this was the third construction of Europe, which 
circulated at its fringes and in the rest of the world, but in the metropolitan 
areas of Europe as well. Pretty much as the former two discourses, this one 
could also have been accepted with pride or rejected in disgust and fear.
All these European constructions of Europe were also the Balkan 
constructions of Europe. There is not a single construction of Europe which 
can be said to be a specifically “Balkan” one. From the early nineteenth cen-
tury, all Balkan societies were busy modernizing themselves by importing 
Western models, this importation being driven by the discourse of Europe 
as modernity. At the same time, there were voices of opposition to this 
process, but this opposition relied on the European construction of the Eu-
rope of Christianity, of the “soul”, especially the soul of the nation, of deep 
Kultur opposed to superficial and materialistic civilisation. “The opposition 
to the ‘import of Western models’ was itself essentially an adaptation of a 
Western import: the advocates of ‘organic’ development were as much a 
mouthpiece of European culture as were those who championed uncondi-
tional Europeanization,” claim Mishkova and Daskalov.18 Balkan scholars 
were always well aware of this: what today to an outside observer may come 
across as Romanian national traditionalism – Junimism – was in fact just a 
replica of German and English evolutionism, maintained Eugen Lovinescu, 
the leading theoretician of Romanian liberalism.19 Slobodan Jovanović, a 
Serbian liberal and a historian, also noted this in the 1920s: the enemies 
18 Diana Miskova and Roumen Daskalov, “‘Forms without substance’: debates on the 
transfer of Western models to the Balkans”, in Roumen Daskalov and Diana Miskova, 
eds., Entangled Histories of the Balkans. Volume 2: Transfer of Political Ideologies and In-
stitutions (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 37.
19 Ibid. 37–38. 
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of liberalism in Serbia advocated a concept of strong government and mo-
narchical authority, but this too was a foreign, Western political pattern.20 
The Balkan voices which are sometimes classified as anti-European were 
particularly loud between the two world wars: this is when, for example, 
a “third way”, neither European nor Asian, was contemplated in Bulgaria 
and Romania, or a “Slavic civilization” dreamed about in Serbia and Bul-
garia. However, the interwar period was everywhere a break, a caesura in 
the development of discourses on Europe. Gerard Delanty claims that this 
was a period when historians, philosophers and writers – but not politi-
cians – conceived modern European identity out of the sense of crisis which 
set in across the continent in the aftermath of the Great War.21 It was not 
only the unprecedented scale of destruction brought about by a war that 
demanded a new beginning; the crisis diagnosed by all who took part in the 
debate about “Europe” was, in fact, the realization that none of the former 
ways of constructing Europe could be sustained any longer. Their disap-
pearance had left a void which was experienced as crisis. If “Europe” was to 
exist, it had to be constructed on ground firmer than Christianity, eroded 
by progressive secularization and the disappearance of religion from public 
life, or “civilization”, unsustainable after a war in which those who ruled 
the world fought each other with previously unseen ferocity, and after the 
realization that one of its components – which in the interwar years was 
to be theorized as modernity or modernization – also had many negative 
aspects to it. On what exactly it could be built was not quite clear. The title 
of Oswald Spengler’s book The Decline of the West accurately sums up the 
mood in the interwar years, and it was read carefully in the Balkans as much 
as elsewhere, fuelling the proliferation of negative constructions of Europe. 
But they proliferated as parts of this larger European discourse of the fall of 
Europe, not as some putative Balkan specificity.
The cold war froze the debate on Europe in the Balkans, with the sole 
exception of Greece, and Europe was off the agenda until the late 1980s – 
when it made a spectacular re-entry. But when it did, it was in the shape of 
the European Union, which now claimed everything European for itself. 
The initial reaction to this in all post-communist Balkan societies was con-
fused: instead of insisting on the difference between the two, Balkan intel-
lectuals and politicians wasted enormous energy on trying to prove the ob-
vious – namely, that their societies, even though they are not in the EU, are 
just as European – and on elbowing for the position of sole representative 
of Europeanness in the Balkans. This latter phenomenon became known in 
scholarship as “nesting orientalisms”: trying to prove that one has always 
20 Slobodan Jovanović, Kulturni obrazac (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 2005). 
21 Delanty, Inventing Europe, 110–111.
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been the only guardian of European values and traditions, and that every-
body else is a despicable Oriental, Byzantine and Asian.22 There was nei-
ther enough confidence nor wisdom to insist quietly on the position which 
Roberto M. Dainotto discovered in Michele Amari’s work, who demanded 
that his Sicily be recognized as a part of Europe and universal history “not 
because it adhered to some putative European standards, but because of 
its unique history and difference”: Sicily was for him a part of Europe not 
because it was reconquered by it, but, simply, because it was.23 This aside, the 
direction was the same in all Balkan societies: towards the European Union.
Today, European integration is almost complete: there are very few 
areas of the continent which are not included in the Union, and these will 
no doubt sooner or later become full members. Yet it seems that, paradoxi-
cally, at the moment which its founders must have envisaged as the triumph 
of the idea of European unity, many feel that the heroic time of the Euro-
pean idea is behind us. This is painfully obvious from the Balkan perspective 
as much as from any other. For the sake of illustration, let us take a brisk 
walk through the landscape created by quite disparate examples, things that 
first come to mind; the examples will not be systematic, but only indica-
tive of what a person surveyed by Eurobarometer could have in mind when 
replying to the usual types of questions put forward, and in this sense more 
important than they seem to be at first sight.
The discourse the EU has created about itself, or, to put it differently, 
the original aims of European integration and the chief sources of its at-
traction, were peace and prosperity in a continent exhausted by two wars, to 
which since the late 1980s were added – for the benefit of the former com-
munist countries – democracy and the rule of law. Hardly anyone would be 
able today to assign these four values to Europe and keep a straight face. As 
for prosperity, Europe does not look like a model to be emulated any longer, 
something that Greeks and Bulgarians, regardless of the length of their 
membership in the Union, but also many other Europeans, would be able 
to go into in great detail.
Peace we do have, but only because European countries are powerful 
enough to fight their wars elsewhere. It cannot be denied that some Euro-
pean states have been in a permanent or intermittent state of war for many 
years now, though the streets of their cities are quiet. It is quite distress-
ing that the European political elite remembered international law and the 
principle of sovereignty only in connection with the crisis in Ukraine, but 
22 Milica Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia”, Slavic 
Review 54/4 (1995), 917–931.
23 Roberto M. Dainotto, Europe (in Theory) (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2007), 210.
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not on any previous occasion in the last twenty years when European states 
found themselves in breach of both: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, 
and very nearly Syria, had it not been for the strong opposition from Russia 
and Europe’s own public opinion. Europe, or at least its most powerful part, 
is not a force for peace. What Anthony Giddens termed “Euro-hypocrisy, 
uncomfortably widespread”, of which European violations of international 
law and the principle of state sovereignty are just the most obvious exam-
ples, can be easily recognized everywhere.24 If one compared readers’ com-
ments in the digital editions of major European newspapers, when with 
regard to Ukraine EU politicians brushed the thick layer of dust off their 
international law manuals, one could have noticed that the general public, 
although informed about the crisis from Europe’s appalling mainstream 
media in which comment is sacred but facts are free, can easily see through 
smoke and mirrors, and achieve a remarkable level of unanimity. The in-
tellectual capacity of the “European street”, to modify the condescending 
expression regularly used to denote public opinion in Arab countries, is 
largely underestimated by the European political elite. And as for uphold-
ing international law and the principle of state sovereignty, it is not quite 
clear if those who have been undermining them for quite a while can be 
those who can uphold it. The farce with President Morales’s airplane held 
and searched in Vienna – which was also a violation of international law, 
although on a much smaller scale – was an embarrassing reminder of how 
quickly Europe can forget the rule of law. The following example is even 
more telling: on 20 December 2013 The Guardian reported that a high court 
judge dismissed the case of Abdel Hakim Belhaj, who was in 2004 unlaw-
fully abducted in a joint MI6-CIA operation, together with his pregnant 
wife; he was then rendered to Tripoli and tortured. Belhaj wanted a British 
court to declare this operation unlawful, a request certainly well-founded, 
but the judge concluded that to pursue the case might harm Britain’s rela-
tions with the US and ruled against him. It seems that the rule of law in 
Europe has its limits there where the national interests of the U.S. begin.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century European democracy 
has become post-democracy, a historically new phenomenon which fuses 
together elements from the recent democratic and more distant pre-demo-
cratic past. Colin Crouch describes post-democracy in the following man-
ner: “Under this model, while elections exist and can change governments, 
public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival 
teams of professional experts in the techniques of persuasion, and consid-
ering a small range of issues selected by those teams. The mass of citizens 
plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to the signals 
24 Anthony Giddens, Europe in the Global Age (London: Polity, 2007), 228.
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given to them. Behind this spectacle of the electoral game, politics is really 
shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites 
that overwhelmingly represent business interests.”25 It is small wonder that 
under these conditions European electorates in recent years have begun to 
give credence to political extremists, to antidemocratic political options, or 
that elected governments of Italy and Greece could have been replaced by 
technocratic cabinets under diktat from Brussels. It is, however, more puz-
zling that the highest elected body of the continent, the European Parlia-
ment, decided to discuss a resolution which would have barred former Ger-
man chancellor Gerhard Schröder from publicly voicing his opinion about 
the crisis in Ukraine.26 Although this motion failed, that such a resolution 
could have been discussed in a global bastion of democracy and, even worse, 
that 44.5 per cent of those present supported it, is an alarming reflection of 
the European Parliament’s understanding of freedom of speech and public 
discussion.
Yet, in spite of all this, what can be heard from the political and me-
dia elite is only a reiteration of the message of Europe as a paragon of social 
and political development to humanity at large – a clear sign of either an 
extreme lack of information, narcissism, or even disinformation. As Perry 
Anderson recently summed it up in his response to criticism of his book The 
Old New World: “That the treaty of Lisbon speaks not of the peoples but of 
the states of Europe; that it was rammed through to circumvent popular 
will, expressed in three referenda; that the structure it enshrines is widely 
distrusted by those subject to it; and that far from being a sanctuary of hu-
man rights, the Union it codified has colluded with torture and occupation, 
without a murmur form its ornaments – all of this vanishes in a stupor of 
self-admiration”.27
When we add to this the unmistakable rise in national and ethnic 
sensibilities all over the continent, it is small wonder that some of those 
who witnessed first-hand the dissolution of Yugoslavia compare the present 
state of the Union with the initial stages of the former’s downfall. If Yugo-
slavia’s end-date was 1991, Joze Mencinger, a Slovene economist, recently 
claimed that Europe is living through its 1983: eight years to dissolution.28 
Mencinger offered this comparison in 2011; since then one EU state has 
already announced a referendum on continuing EU membership. Many el-
ements are already there for all to see: for example, the economic crisis, in 
25 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (London: Polity, 2012), 4.
26 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/european-parliament-wants-to-muzzle-
ukraine-comments-from-schroeder-a-958497.html#ref=rss [accessed 15 March 2014]. 
27 Perry Anderson, “After the Event”, New Left Review 73 (2012), 51.
28 “Evropa kao bivša Jugoslavija”, Vreme no. 1088, 10 November 2011. 
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which those better off complain of having to subsidize those worst off, while 
the latter complain that they are being exploited by the former. Robert M. 
Hayden extended the list of similarities: each Yugoslav republican leader-
ship worked only for the benefit of its own constituency; a high level of 
sovereign debt; a single currency which left the republics very limited scope 
for manoeuvre and set them on mutually antagonistic political courses, and 
since decisions could only be taken by consensus, as every republic had a 
veto power, with deadlock as a result; a group presidency with a rotating 
chairperson, operating in the same manner as the Council of the EU, which 
only formally led the country, while real power lay in the republics; the 
Yugoslav federal government, pretty much as the European Commission, 
was not accountable to voters, but to republican governments; as in Yugo-
slavia, in the EU neither the Council nor the Commission are accountable 
to the entire population, but only to one of the state members.29 Neither 
Mencinger nor Hayden suggest that the EU will be dissolved in a war, and 
it does not have to; but Hayden reminds the reader that in Yugoslavia too 
no one believed in the possibility of war, even when it became known that 
several EU states, in addition to the Soviet Union, were secretly supplying 
arms and ammunition to the constituent republics. In Yugoslavia and its 
dissolution the Balkans offers Europe a mirror: it may choose to ignore it, 
but it would be wise to take a good look at it.
As between the world wars, “Europe” once again experiences a crisis: 
the cornerstones of the construction of “Europe” in the guise of the Euro-
pean Union – peace, prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law – do not have 
the power to convince any longer. This discourse has left a void in its wake, 
which is experienced everywhere as a crisis, and which political scientists 
describe as a mere “waning of enthusiasm” soon to be overcome.30 Europe 
has already shown a remarkable capacity for re-invention. It re-invented 
itself after the Second World War, and the EU experienced several brief 
periods of slowing down; it may – hopefully without a new war – construct 
a new discourse about itself again. Whoever is about to embark on this proj-
ect would be well advised to listen to the counsel of an eminent European, 
the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer: he did not have much to 
say about the pragmatic aspects of the EU integration, nor was he much 
interested in it, but he had something important to say about the conditions 
under which this integration can be carried out.
29 Robert M. Hayden, From Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans. Studies of a European Dis-
union 1991–2011 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 377–387. 
30 Paul Taylor, The End of European Integration. Anti-Europeanism Examined (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2008).
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Almost at the end of his long life, Gadamer, who had rarely voiced his 
political opinions, published a brief book Das Erbe Europas (1989), or The 
Heritage of Europe. It seemed at first sight that Gadamer simply paid tribute 
to the then fashionable search for European identity, but he actually posed 
an important, perhaps the most important question: what does “belonging 
together” actually mean? European nations belong together, we hear all the 
time; they are in the same boat. And sitting in the same boat, how can they 
truly be together? Gadamer offered Europeans what he thought was miss-
ing the most, and it was a lesson in humility. Humility as a way of relating 
to others is indispensable in hermeneutics, Gadamer’s own philosophical 
discipline, it is the “soul of hermeneutics”, in the sense that by hermeneu-
tics Gadamer understood “the ability to listen to the other in the belief 
that the other could be right”.31 We Europeans “must learn that we could 
be wrong”,32 wrote Gadamer. This cryptic half-sentence echoes Gadamer’s 
most important book Truth and Method, where he elaborated the same idea 
in the following manner: “Belonging together always also means being able 
to listen to one another. When two people understand each other, this does 
not mean that one person ‘understands’ the other. Similarly, ‘to hear and 
obey someone’ does not mean simply that we do blindly what the other 
desires. We call such a person slavish. Openness to the other, then, involves 
recognizing that I myself must accept some things that are against me, even 
though no one else forces me to do so.”33 Understanding is not a one-way 
street, in which only I understand you, in the sense of having knowledge 
about you, which then I offer to you – better still, demand that you accept 
it – as your own self-knowledge. And the other way around: understanding 
does not occur when you listen to me and obey, either because you believe 
that I know better or that I have the means to force you into submission. In 
both these situations, no one understands anything, neither I, with my sup-
posedly superior knowledge and power to impose it, nor you, with your ad-
miration and slavishness. True understanding, openness to the other, with-
out which there is no belonging together, requires that I also allow that my 
understanding reveals things which are against me, even if there is no one 
there to voice them, and that I accept them as such not only for the sake of 
being together, but for my own sake as well. If we were to follow Gadamer’s 
31 Gadamer quoted in Jean Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer. A Biography (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 250. 
32 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The diversity of Europe: inheritance and future”, in Hans-
Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry and History. Applied Hermeneutics, eds. Dieter Mis-
geld and Graeme Nicholson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 233. 
33 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London and New York: Continuum, 
2004), 355.
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advice, we would be immediately relieved from vanity and narcissism, the 
“stupor of self-admiration” and the stifling ideological atmosphere which 
emanates from much of what we hear about Europe these days.
But what does this “belonging together” mean when applied to Eu-
rope? How can peoples and states “belong together”? The feeling of belong-
ing together is certainly one aspect of what in other contexts has been called 
European identity. It has been noted many times that European political 
identity can be built only if Europeans are allowed to debate freely and 
reach common decisions about their political future, binding for all, in a 
single public space – something that does not seem likely to happen any 
time soon. Quite naturally, the level of identification with the EU is only 
modest: according to the Eurobarometer, since 2010 the percentage of those 
feeling fully like EU citizens actually fell by one per cent, from 21% to 20%, 
and of those feeling European “to some extent” by three per cent, from 41% 
to 39%. On the other hand, everybody finds a unified European cultural 
identity even less achievable, because Europeans do not have a single cul-
tural tradition and do speak many languages. This is exactly what Gadamer 
understood as the future European way of belonging together: Europe as a 
community which speaks many languages, not only many natural languages, 
but many complex second-degree languages – such as religion, historical 
narratives, poetry and philosophy – which preserve multiple records of our 
different values and different historical experiences. Being with the other 
would here mean participating in the other by understanding the other-
ness. The opposite of it is the drive to master and to control something. The 
attitude of humility, of knowledge that we could be wrong and that others 
could be right, of learning “that we may not simply exploit our means of 
power and effective possibilities, but must learn to stop and respect an other 
as an other, whether it is nature or grown cultures of peoples and nations”34 
is the only way of belonging and staying together. Realizing this – regardless 
of the possible outcomes – would at least make a good beginning. 
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